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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: HEAD V. LITHONIA,
SCRUTINY OF THE UNDERLYING BASES OF AN
EXPERT OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of "science" and scientific evidence in the courtroom can
be traced as far back as fourteenth century England.' "Scientific evi-
dence has always posed special problems for the law, and in recent years
these problems have become increasingly difficult."1
2
In today's litigious society, individuals are clamoring to find some-
one to blame for all the evils that beset their lives. In the course of their
quest, these individuals are consistently turning to experts as a source of
support for their positions. The complexity of lawsuits is continuously
increasing. More and more lawsuits are being brought in the area of
products liability and toxic torts by individuals who feel victimized.
There is also growing concern over the evolution of cases based on the
fear of contracting cancer or another disease years after the alleged ex-
posure to a chemical or other agent.3
In the face of this current trend, courts are being presented with
complex issues requiring the use of scientific evidence in greater
frequency.
4
The use of statistics, risk assessment, animal studies, epidemio-
logical data, regulatory or statutory findings, and various theo-
ries of carcinogenesis in the courtroom have revolutionized
tort litigation practice, resulting in a proliferation of... judicial
pronouncements and rulings on the value, use, and misuse of
science and science policy in the courtroom.5
As a result, being an expert has become big business. Courts are
becoming increasingly concerned that, for a price, litigants can hire an
expert to say virtually anything that is advantageous to the litigant's
claim or defense. There is a growing suspicion that experts can be
found to support any position in a trial.6 Against this backdrop, reliance
on expert witnesses is increasing in legal decision making.
7
1. Black, A Unified Theoy of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 597 at n.1
(1988).
2. Id.
3. Summary of Developments, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1448 (Apr. 12, 1989)
(comment by Rene Tatro, partner in the law firm of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe).
4. Note, Diferent Standards and Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Frye Test for
Admitting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectrographic Evidence Introduc-
tion, 5 REv. oF LrnG. 327, 329 (1986).
5. Courtroom Science: Toxic Tort Battleground, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1336
(Mar. 22, 1989) ("Because of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in toxic tort cases,
the role of scientific and statistical evidence has become increasingly important.").
6. Summary of Developments, supra note 3, at 1444 (comment by judge H. Lee Sarokin,
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York).
7. R. GIVENS, DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 7.07, at 197 (1989).
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Judicial concern about the reliability of expert opinions also ap-
pears to be on the rise, especially in the face of scientific uncertainty.8
Additionally, the judiciary is concerned that the perceived erosion of im-
partiality in the use of experts is lowering confidence in the credibility of
the judicial system. 9
To curb this "expert shopping" and the abuses caused by the use of
expert witnesses who are paid to assert the position most advantageous
to the litigant who has hired them, courts are looking behind expert
opinions.' 0 It is becoming commonplace for courts to scrutinize the un-
derlying sources and bases of expert opinions to determine whether any
factual foundation exists for an opinion the expert is espousing.' I
The tendency of lay jurors to give considerable weight to scientific
evidence presented by experts with impressive credentials also causes
the judiciary concern. 1 2 "Where is always a danger that a jury may at-
tach too great a weight to expert testimony because of the person offer-
ing it."' 3
Lay people also have the idea that science is reliable and often infal-
lible. 14 The traditional view of the scientific method is that it is exact
and certain. Examples of this mentality can be seen every day. How
many people stopped eating bacon because of the scientific reports that
the nitrates in bacon cause cancer? This is just one example of society's
willingness to accept as truth whatever scientists say. "The court[s] will
have to evaluate the degree to which the jurors might be overimpressed
by the aura of reliability surrounding the evidence, thereby leading them
to abdicate their role of critical assessment."' 5 Appellate courts have
routinely manifested a thorough, ongoing skepticism of the jury's ability
to cope with the complexities of scientific evidence.'
6
This Comment examines the history of the admissibility of scientific
evidence beginning with Frye v. United States 17 and explores the solutions
and alternatives modern courts have adopted to deal with the concerns
attendant with the increased use of scientific evidence. This background
is the precedent for the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Head v.
Lithonia,'8 which enunciates this circuit's answer to the problems associ-
8. Id.
9. Summary of Developnents, supra note 3, at 1447.
10. R. GIVENS, supra note 7, § 7.07, at 197-98.
11. See Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987); Lynch v. Merrel-
National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (summary judgment granted con-
trary to experts' contentions).
12. See Arnett v. Dow Chem. Co., 6 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LrIG. REP. No. 3, at
383 (Aug. 1983) (Cal. Super. Ct. 1983). In Arnett, the court made an inquiry into the
underlying facts and data upon which the expert based his conclusion.
13. F. Haddad, Admissibility of Expert Testimony, I FORENSICS SCIENCES 1-4 (1987).
14. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (scientific evi-
dence may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen").
15. 3J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 702[03], at 702-42 to -43
(1982).
16. Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 92 (1987).
17. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
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ated with the use of scientific evidence. It can reasonably be expected
that this decision will resolve the confusion and abuses that permeate
the use of expert testimony based on scientific evidence.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Fye v. United States
Historically, courts have been suspicious of scientific evidence, even
when it is supported by expert opinion. Prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence ("Rules"), the practice was to screen pur-
ported scientific studies and expert testimony in order to determine
whether such evidence had "general acceptance" in the scientific com-
munity.1 9 This became known as the Fye rule, or the "general accept-
ance test."
2 0
Frye was decided in 1923 by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia and marked the first judicial recognition of the
need for special rules for scientific evidence. 2 1 The defendant in Frye
attempted to introduce results of a systolic blood pressure deception
test, an early form of the lie-detector test, and an expert's opinion that,
when tested, the defendant had been truthful in denying any involve-
ment in the crime for which he was charged.
22
Under Frye, if the proponent failed to establish the "general accept-
ance" of the evidence, it was not considered reliable evidence for the
jury to consider.2 3 In the court's words:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principal must be recognized, and while courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.
2 4
Although the Frye court did not cite authority or offer any explana-
tion for adopting the general acceptance theory, it was the dominant test
for admissibility of scientific evidence from the early twentieth century
until the last quarter of that century.
2 5
Since the advent of Frye, scientific knowledge has expanded signifi-
cantly. This growth has eroded the simplistic notion that the most im-
portant scientific facts are known and accepted by everyone in a
19. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
20. Id.
21. Black, supra note 1, at 629.
22. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. R. GIVENS, supra note 7, § 7.02, at 187. See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197
(1980).
1990] 589
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particular field, whereas facts outside this realm are too speculative to be
considered. 26 Because of this growth, whether Frye remains as the con-
trolling standard for scientific evidence is hotly debated among courts
and commentators alike.
Even before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Frye did
not stand uncriticized. Emerging as the chief critic of the general ac-
ceptance standard, Professor McCormick wrote:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking
judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions
which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Particu-
larly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar dangers
of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption
of time. If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating a
supposed requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere
imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of utilizing the
results of scientific advances.
27
Professor McCormick, therefore, advocated a relevancy approach to de-
termine the admissibility of scientific evidence, which was later adopted
in the Rules. 28 One of the questions debated by the courts today is
whether the Rules supersede the Frye test.29 The Rules are silent on this
point, which only complicates the controversy surrounding Fye's cur-
rent status.3
0
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Relevancy Approach
When the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975,31
they further complicated the standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Neither the advisory committee notes nor the legislative his-
tory of the Rules specifically discuss Frye, nor do they mention the gen-
eral acceptance test.32 Both courts and commentators are divided over
whether the Rules supersede Frye's general acceptance test.33 While
some circuits continue to apply Frye, others have either expressly re-
jected Frye as the test for determining admissibility of scientific evi-
dence3 4 or have not made a determination one way or the other.3 5
26. R. GIVENS, supra note 7, § 7.02, at 185.
27. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972).
28. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982)).
29. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
30. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 330.
31. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982)).
32. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1228-29.
33. See P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKLEREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5(f), at 28 (1986)
[hereinafter GIANNELLI & IMWINKLEREID]. Compare 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACICE AND PROCEDURE 92 (1977) (Frye has been abandoned and repealed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence) with 1 D. LourSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 818 (1977)
(Frye has survived the Federal Rules of Evidence).
34. See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1169 (8th Cir. 1980) (court stated
that it had not adopted "generally accepted explanatory theory"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939
[Vol. 67:4
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It can be argued that the Rules' silence as to Frye is tantamount to
abandonment of the general acceptance test. On the other hand, it also
can be argued that because Frye was the established rule prior to enact-
ment of the Rules, and no statement repudiating Frye appears in the leg-
islative history, the general .acceptance standard remains intact.
3 6
Regardless of which position a court may choose, the language of the
Rules adopts the reasoning of Professor McCormick, who advocated the
relevancy approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
3 7
The relevancy approach of the Rules is the primary alternative to
the Frye test.3 8 This approach examines scientific evidence as it would
any other evidence3 9 by determining relevance and then applying the
balancing test of Rule 403.40 Those who advocate that the Rules super-
sede Frye focus on the language of the Rules.
4 1
Rule 402 specifically states that "[a]U relevant evidence is admissi-
ble, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules proscribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."'42 Rule 401 de-
fines relevant evidence as evidence "having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
' '43
Because scientific evidence can be reliable and therefore relevant
under Rule 401 without regard to general acceptance in the scientific
community, the Rules provide a standard of admissibility inconsistent
(1980); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978) (court held that the gen-
eral acceptance test of Frye did not survive enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
that the court should assess reliability and helpfulness, and balance these against counter-
vailing considerations expressed in Rule 403), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United
States v. Baler, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1974) ("Unless an exaggerated popular opin-
ion of the accuracy of aparticular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead
the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other
expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refuta-
tion."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
35. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 304 n.15 (4th Cir. 1984) (de-
spite expressed concerns about Frye, the Fourth Circuit continues to apply it in certain
circumstances); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031
n.9 (5th Cir. 1984) (Fifth Circuit continues to apply Frye even if its applicability after the
Federal Rules of Evidence is unresolved); United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1087-88
n.3 (I th Cir. 1983) (theEleventh Circuit has yet to decide whether Frye survives the Fed-
eral Rules).
36. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1229.
37. See supra note 27, and accompanying text.
38. See GIANNEui & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 33, § 1-6, at 31.
39. Defending Immunoloxicity Claims, 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1223 (Mar. 1,
1989).
40. Id. The Rule 403 balancing test involves weighing the probative value of the evi-
dence against the countervailing considerations expressed in the rule. Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 specifically provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
41. See Giannelli, supra note 25, at 1230.
42. FED. R. EVID. 402.
43. FED. R. EvID. 401. -
1990]
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with the Frye test.44 Under the clear language of the Rules, Frye is inap-
plicable. Rather, it is a relevancy test which is employed to determine
whether expert opinion based on scientific evidence is admissible.
In United States v. Downing,45 the court opined that the Rules sug-
gest, if not mandate, a relevancy approach:
In our view, Rule 702 requires that a district court ruling upon
the admission of [novel] scientific evidence, i.e., evidence
whose scientific fundaments are not suitable candidates for ju-
dicial notice, conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the
soundness and reliability of the process or technique used in
generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the
evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and
(3) the proffered connection between the scientific research or
test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual is-
sues in the case.
46
This is akin to the balancing test of Rule 403. 47 The premise espoused
in Downing is further supported by Rule 702, which governs the admissi-
bility of expert testimony. Rule 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, techni-
cal or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine the fact in issue, a witness may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
'48
In sum, the relevancy approach of the Rules can be broken down
into three steps. 4 9 The first step is to assess the probative value of the
proffered scientific evidence. 50 The next step is to identify any counter-
vailing dangers. 5 ' The final step is to balance the probative value of the
proffered evidence against the identified dangers or other considera-
tions. 52 A similar balancing test is used by courts that follow the relia-
bility approach to determine admissibility of scientific evidence.
C. The Reliability Approach
The reliability approach is a third method of determining the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence via expert opinion. The massive toxic
tort litigation case In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation 53 discusses
this third method of analysis, which is a hybrid of the Federal Rules of
Evidence relevancy approach and the Frye general acceptance test. The
reliability approach involves a balancing of the relevance, reliability, and
44. GANNELu & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 33, § 1-5(f), at 29-30. See also Giannelli,
supra note 25, at 1230.
45. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 1237.
47. See FED. R. EvID. 403. See also supra note 40.
48. FED. R. EvID. 702.
49. See generally GIAuwEw & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 33, § 1-6(A-C), at 31-34.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1-6(C), at 34. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir.
1985) (court noted that the most efficient procedure for determining admissibility under
the relevancy approach is the in limine hearing).
53. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub nora. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
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helpfulness of the evidence against the likelihood of confusion, waste of
time, and prejudice.M
This approach focuses primarily on a preliminary inquiry into the
underlying bases and sources of an expert's opinion to determine its
reliability. The inquiry does not go as far as Frye to require general ac-
ceptance of the scientific theory, but requires only that the methods
used to reach the opinion are those on which others in the scientific
community reasonably rely in reaching their own, possibly different
conclusions.
Courts that have abandoned Frye for the reliability approach stress
Rule 702's liberal attitude toward the, admissibility of relevant expert
testimony whenever it would be helpful to the jury.55 Although Rule
702 sets forth this liberal policy toward qualification of an expert wit-
ness, compliance with the rule does not automatically guarantee the ad-
missibility of such expert testimony.56 -
The Agent Orange court recognized that Rule 703 limits the bases
upon which an expert may rely in rendering an opinion to those which
are "reasonably relied" upon by "experts in the field."' 57 Rule 703
provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.
58
When expert testimony is derived from novel scientific theories, the
courts will make a determination as to the admissibility of the underlying
bases and sources of the opinion.
59
The preliminary inquiry was further discussed with some vehe-
mence in In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation.60 Paoli involved a suit
by residents who claimed personal injuries from exposure to a nearby
railroad's storage area for polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs").61 At is-
sue was whether the court was permitted to look behind the experts'
54. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1242.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1243.
58. FED. R. EvID. 703.
59. In a study released on March 29, 1990, the Center for Disease Control ("CDC")
specifically denied a link between Agent Orange exposure and incidence of cancer. Den-
ver Post, Mar. 30, 1990, at A2. The results of the CDC study provide further support for
the reliability approach. Specifically at issue in In re Agent Orange was whether Agent
Orange caused disease, particularly cancer in servicemen who were in Vietnam. The ex-
pert testimony on this point was focused on by the court in its discussion of scientific
evidence. It should be noted that the Agent Orange cases never proceeded to trial. See
generally In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chem. Co., 487 U.S.
1234 (1988).
60. 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
61. Id.
1990]
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statements or whether the court was bound by the experts' assertions. 6 2
On this point, the court stated:
If Rule 703 is to be any limit on the ability of expert witnesses
to give their opinions, a court must be permitted to examine
the bases of the proffered opinions. Otherwise, any case in
which an expert was willing to use two sets of magic words
would always survive motions for summary judgment and di-
rected verdict. As long as the expert was willing to say "to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty" and "the basis of my
opinion is X, on which experts in my field reasonably rely,"
every case requiring expert testimony would get to the jury. If
a court is not permitted to examine the basis of an expert's
opinion in order to rule on the admissibility of that opinion,
then Rule 703 should read: "An expert may cite as the basis of
his opinion anything he likes."
'63
The Paoli court engaged in a preliminary inquiry and, relying on the
reasoning of Agent Orange, held that the expert testimony was
inadmissible.
Agent Orange specifically determined that "Rule 104(a) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence requires a court to make a preliminary inquiry
into the admissibility of expert testimony." 4 It was this limitation that
was recently recognized by the Tenth Circuit in Head v. Lithonia.
65
III. HEAD v. LiTHONi
A. Facts
In November of 1985, plaintiff Barbara Head was injured at work
when the reflector portion of a hanging fluorescent light fixture fell and
struck her on the side of her head.6 6 Although the plaintiff was neither
knocked to the ground nor knocked unconscious, she felt a knot raised
on the right side of her head. Three weeks later, she reported the inci-
dent to her employer and visited the company doctor, complaining of
dizziness, headaches, and occasional blackouts. Thereafter, the plaintiff
was placed on medical leave and was subsequently terminated.
The plaintiff brought an action against Lithonia Corporation, alleg-
ing the quarter-turn fastener on the light was defective in design and
failed to secure the reflector properly in place in its grooved channel.
She claimed that this defect made the product unreasonably dangerous.
The plaintiff sought $1,250,000 for the permanent injuries to her head
and neck, while her husband sought $100,000 for loss of consortium.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 368. In re Paoli is currently pending before the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.
64. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1239. Rule 104(a) specifically provides in
pertinent part: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court ...."
65. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 942.
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During trial, the plaintiff called her treating neurologist, Dr.
Michael Haugh, as a medical expert to support her claims of injury to
her head and neck. Dr. Haugh testified by videotaped deposition and
explained his conclusions, which were based on the plaintiff's medical
history, clinical exam, and various tests. The results of the electroen-
cephalogram ("EEG"), computerized axial tomography ("CAT-scan"),
and clinical exam were normal. One test, however, topographical brain
mapping, apparently pinpointed the location of her injury. Dr. Haugh
concluded on the bases of the plaintiff's history and the topographical
brain mapping that she suffered from postconcussive syndrome and pre-
scribed medication to alleviate the headaches.
During his testimony, "Dr. Haugh described the topographical
brain map test he performed which, he explained, was a computerized
enhancement of the EEG, using stimulation techniques 'to bring out ab-
normalities on the EEG.' "67 When asked when he first began using
topographical brain mapping, Dr. Haugh explained that he was the first
neurologist in the Tulsa area to use the test and maintain the equipment
in his office.68 Over defense objection, the doctor offered his personal
opinion as to the value of topographical brain mapping compared with
traditional EEG methods. Aside from this testimony and his description
of the brain mapping test, Dr. Haugh offered no other information from
which, the jury could understand the reliability of the test; that is, he
offered no information on whether the scientific community had ac-
cepted topographical brain mapping.
When the plaintiff attempted to introduce exhibits representing the
results of the topographical brain map tests, the defendant objected,
contending that a proper foundation had not been offered for the test.6 9
After the jury viewed the videotape, the defense renewed its objection,
which was overruled without explanation.
On cross-examination, Dr. Haugh admitted that much controversy
surrounds topographical brain mapping.70 While recognizing that the
procedure may be beyond the experimental stage, the doctor could not
explain the methodology in the clinical setting.
Dr. Haugh also testified on cross-examination that all of his findings
based on the clinical examination and other test results were normal and
did not substantiate the plaintiff's complaint. It was only when these
results were coupled with the topographical brain mapping that the doc-
tor was able to conclude that the plaintiff suffered from postconcussive
syndrome.
7 1
Despite the propriety of the defendant's objections, the district
court did not examine the reliability of the foundation of the expert's
67. Id.
68. Id. at 944.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 942-43.
71. I at 943.
-1990]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
opinion to determine its admissibility. 7 2 Ultimately, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $100,000, but did not
award anything to the plaintiff's husband.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in
permitting the plaintiff to introduce the topographical brain mapping
test results without establishing the necessary foundation for the relia-
bility of the test.7
3
B. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
At the outset of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit cited Barrel of Fun, Inc.
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,74 which held that the proponent of sci-
entific evidence "has the burden of showing as .a predicate to its admis-
sion that the proffered test has achieved scientific acceptability and that
the test has a reasonable measure of trustworthiness."' 75 The court rec-
ognized that Dr. Haugh offered no information on the test's reliability,
other than his personal opinion as to the value of topographical brain
mapping and a description of the test itself.
76
In a detailed analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court
recognized that Rule 70377 gives experts wide latitude to testify on facts
otherwise not admissible and broadens the bases on which expert opin-
ions may be offered. 78 The purpose of this broadening was to "bring
the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves
when not in court."'79 The court pointed out, however,, that although
Rule 703 performs this broadening function, the advisory.notes caution:
If it be feared that enlargement of permissible data may tend to
break down the rules of exclusion unduly, notice should be
taken that the rule requires that the facts or data "be of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field;" This
language would not warrant admitting in evidence the opinion
of an "accidentologist" as to the point of impact in an automo-
bile collision based on statements of bystanders, since this re-
quirement is not satisfied.
80
In commenting on Rule 703 as elaborated by the advisory commit-
tee notes, the court stated that the Rule's limitation provides courts with
a mechanism to evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of the under-
lying data and sources on which experts rely.8 ' This does not mean,
72. Id. at 944.
73. Id. at 942-43.
74. 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1984) (expert testimony based on psychological
stress evaluation ("PSE") was offered).
75. Id. at 1032 (citation omitted). In Barrel of Fun, Inc., 739 F.2d 1033, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that the burden was not met by simply stating that the PSE test was used by the
fire marshall's office.
76. Head, 881 F.2d at 944.
77. See supra text accompanying note 58.
78. Head, 881 F.2d at 944.
79. Id. at 943.
80. Id. (quoting advisory comments to FED. R. EvID. 703).
81. Id. See also Barel of Fun, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1033.
596 [Vol. 67:4
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however, "that the expert's opinion must be generally accepted in the
scientific community to be 'sufficiently reliable and probative to support
ajury finding.' "82 The court goes on to conclude: "What is necessary is
that the expert arrived at his . . . opinion by relying upon methods that
other experts in his field would reasonably rely upon in forming their
own, possibly different opinions, about what caused the patient's
disease."8
3
Although the court acknowledged that experts are given wide lati-
tude to testify to facts that are otherwise inadmissible and "to broaden
the acceptable bases of expert opinion,"8 4 the court stated that Rule 703
implicitly requires the trial judge to make a preliminary determination
pursuant to Rule 104(a)85 as to whether the underlying data is of a kind
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.8 6
The court specifically noted that cross-examination testimony at
trial revealed that topographical brain mapping is relatively experimen-
tal and that the technique has not been accepted by other neurologists
or the American Academy of Neurology.87 Disturbed by the trial
judge's failure to make the required preliminary inquiry into the reliabil-
ity of the foundation of the expert's opinion,88 the court concluded that
this omission amounted to an abuse of discretion which mandated
reversal.8
9
In discussing the preliminary inquiry in which courts must engage,
the court pointed out that the "determination must be made on 'a case-
by-case basis and should focus on the reliability of the opinion and its
foundation.' "90 Based on this requirement, the court stated that a "dis-
trict court 'may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if
the bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admis-
sibility.' "91 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit vacated the judgment of the
trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.92
IV. ANALYsis
The debate surrounding the admissibility of scientific evidence has
been raging since the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in
82. Head, 881 F.2d at 943 (quoting Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, 825 F.2d 908,915
(5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
83. Id. (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 944 (quoting Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 672-73
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
85. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
86. Id. See also 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M: BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, 702[03], at
703-16 (1982).
87. Head, 881 F.2d at 943.
88. Id. at 944.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1983)).
91. Id. (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow
Chem. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988)).
92. Id.
1990]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1975.93 It is clear from Head v. Lithonia94 that the Tenth Circuit joined
ranks with those who support the reliability approach, albeit the court
did not specifically state this circuit's position regarding Frye.
In fact, the Tenth Circuit has not expressly stated whether Frye is to
be followed in this jurisdiction. In Marks v. United States,95 the Tenth
Circuit had before it a criminal case where, as in Frye, the defendant
proffered the results of a lie-detector test.96 The court discussed Frye
insofar as it discussed lie-detector tests, but did not elaborate on the
general acceptance test.
9 7
In its discussion, the court noted numerous decisions from other
jurisdictions which refused to accept lie-detector evidence. 98 "We have
considered the question and are inclined to hold to the reasoning of the
courts which have refused to receive such evidence." 9 9 The Marks court
never made a determination as to whether the Tenth Circuit had
adopted Frye as the test for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence.1 00 Whether the court intended its decision in Marks to adopt
Frye as the standard to be applied when determining admissibility of sci-
entific evidence is debatable.
If Marks is construed as adopting Frye as the rule in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, Head abandons that construction. In its initial discussion in Head,
the court cited Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,l1 from
the Fifth Circuit, which continues to apply Frye even if its applicability
after adoption of the Rules is unresolved.10 2 This fact alone would
seem to lend support to the argument that the Tenth Circuit agrees with
the Fifth and also continues to apply Fryfe's general acceptance test. The
court's language in Head indicates, however, that the Tenth Circuit has
abandoned Frye for the reliability, approach. 103
Nevertheless, the reliability approach is not a pure abandonment of
Frye; rather, it is a hybrid of the general acceptance test of Frye and the
relevancy approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 4 As such, the
reliability approach is better suited for the modem court than is either
the Frye test or the relevancy test, given society's technological advances
and thejudiciary's concern with the abuses associated with using expert
witnesses.
Support for the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the reliability approach
93. Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
app. (1982)).
94. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
95. 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929 (1959).
96. Id. at 382.
97. Id.
98. Id. at n.3.
99. Id. at 382.
100. It must be noted, however, that Marks was decided prior to the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and, thus, the court was not in a position where it needed to
take a stand as to Ftye.
101. 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 1031, n.9.
103. Head, 881 F.2d at 943-44.
104. See supra Part II, section C.
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can be found in the language of Rule 703,105 which was discussed by the
court. Rule 703 provides as a limitation on expert opinions that the
facts and data "be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field." 10 6 This requirement is somewhat akin to the general acceptance
test of Frye, but is not as strict.
10 7
Frye requires that there be general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity of the scientific theory in order for it to be admissible.' 0 8 The
approach advocated in Head does not require that the expert opinion be
generally accepted in the scientific community in order to be "suffi-
ciently reliable and probative to support ajury finding."' 1 9 Rather, it is
only the methods used by the expert in formulating an opinion that other
experts in the field must reasonably rely upon in forming their own, pos-
sibly different, opinions. 1 0 In sum, it is not the expert's opinion itself
which must be generally accepted or reasonably relied upon by others in
the scientific community, but only the methods used in reaching that
opinion.
Head is not the first case to require a court to make a preliminary
determination' as to the reliability of the underlying bases and sources
of an expert opinion. 112 Courts are more frequently turning to the pre-
liminary inquiry to prevent litigants from hiring an expert for the sole
purpose of saying whatever is most advantageous to the litigant's claim
or defense."l 8 "Without more than credentials and a subjective opin-
ion, an expert's testimony that 'it is so' is not admissible."' 14 Several
courts have determined that the preliminary inquiry is especially impor-
tant in complex cases because of the need to rely on expert opinions to
prove the litigant's claims." 5
The trend towards scrutinizing the underlying bases and sources of
an expert opinion is appropriate in that it effectively curbs the abuses
105. FED. R. EvID. 703. See supra text accompanying note 58.
106. Head, 881 F.2d at 943.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
108. Id.
109. See generally Head, 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 943.
111. See supra text. accompanying notes 60-65.
112. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Viterbo v.
Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1985); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th
Cir. 1984); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In rejapanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Villari v. Terminix
Int'l Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lom-
bardi v. Dow Chem. Co. 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
113. See generally Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1987).
114. Id. at 424.
115. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (this is
particularly important "when dealing with injuries or diseases of a type that may inflict
society at random, often with no known specific origin"); In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp.
at 1244, (" 'Rigorous examination' is especially important in the mass toxic tort context
where presentation to the trier of theories of causation depends almost entirely on expert
testimony.").
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caused by "expert shopping." If the courts undertake a preliminary in-
quiry of the underlying bases and sources of an expert's opinion, only
scientific evidence that is sufficiently reliable will be presented to the
jury for its consideration.
In Head, the Tenth Circuit found the plaintiff's evidence on topo-
graphical brain mapping to be inadmissible.' 16 The court was not con-
vinced that the trustworthiness of topographical brain mapping or its
acceptance in the relevant scientific community was established at
trial.1 7 Had the trial court engaged in the preliminary inquiry which is
the main thrust of the reliability approach, Head v. Lithonia might never
have been litigated.
V. CONCLUSION
There has been much trial and error in the evolution of the law
concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence. The reliability ap-
proach adopted by Head v. Lithonia 1"8 is an effective test for courts con-
fronted with this issue. The two alternatives, Fye's general acceptance
test and the relevancy approach, are not as complete or as thorough as
the reliability approach.' 19 The reason for this is that the reliability ap-
proach takes into consideration the concerns of both Frye and the rele-
vancy approach.
Fiye stands at one end of the spectrum and leads to harsh results,
which derive from its strict requirement that the expert's opinion be
generally accepted in the scientific community.120 If science is to be
used in the courtroom at a pace in step with scientific developments,
requiring general acceptance is overly burdensome. Presently, the gen-
eral acceptance requirement is difficult to overcome, and a litigant may
be prevented from introducing sound evidence as a result. Even though
the expert's opinion is based on methodologies which are accepted in
the scientific community, the opinions formed using those methodolo-
gies will not be admissible unless generally accepted.
The relevancy approach, on the other hand, stands at the opposite
end of the spectrum and is too lenient when it comes to admission of
scientific evidence. Under this approach, a litigant need only show that
the proffered scientific evidence is relevant and that its probative value
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 12 1 The Federal Rules of
Evidence themselves favor admissibility; therefore, establishing rele-
vance is a rather simple task. Courts will be required to spend a tremen-
dous amount of time allowing litigants to present the multitude of
evidence permitted under this method. The relevancy approach also
fails to consider the reliability of the proffered evidence, and is at the
116. Head, 881 F.2d at 944.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra Part II, sections A and B.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25.
121. See supra Part II, section B.
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opposite end of the spectrum from Fye, which was overly concerned
with the reliability of the evidence.
By taking what is best from each of the alternatives, the reliability
approach offers a fair, evenhanded method of determining the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence. It balances the concerns of both Fye and the
relevancy approach without abandoning the goals of either.
Because the reliability approach focuses on the underlying bases
and sources of an expert's opinion, a court can ensure that experts are
not simply espousing whatever they are being paid to say. The prelimi-
nary inquiry, which is the main thrust of the reliability approach, 12 2 has
undertones of Frye, in that a court must first determine the reliability of
the underlying bases and sources of an expert's opinion. It does not,
however, go as far as Frye to require general acceptance of the expert's
opinion in the scientific community.12 3 Rather, only the expert's meth-
odology in reaching an opinion need be of a type that experts in the
field would reasonably rely upon in reaching their own condusions.1
2 4
This is a workable approach, neither overly strict, as is Frye, nor too leni-
ent, as is the relevancy approach.
Moreover, the reliability approach borrows the balancing test of the
relevancy approach to serve the same basic function. 12 5 Even though an
expert opinion may be found to be reliable through the preliminary in-
quiry, the court will still engage in the Rule 403 balancing test.
12 6
Because the reliability approach borrows from both the Frye test and
the relevancy approach, it provides the safeguards of each. This is espe-
cially important today in light of the increase in complex cases where
scientific evidence has become commonplace as a method of proof.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Head v. Lithonia accomplishes more
than simply setting forth this circuit's position regarding the status of
Frye. Questions concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence will
now be determined using the reliability approach.' 2 7 "Rule 703 con-
templates that the court will play some role in the assessment of expert
testimony offered to ajury. While the trial process can leverage the pro-
bative value of this testimony, the process presupposes the court's
guidance."12
8
As a result of Head, the Tenth Circuit courts will conduct a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the underlying bases and sources of experts' opinions
to determine whether the testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
presented to the jury.12 9 This should bridge the gap between the overly
strict Frye test and the leniency of the relevancy approach. Since use of
122. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
126. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th
Cir. 1984). See also supra note 40.
127. 881 F.2d 941 (10th Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 944.
129. Id.
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expert witnesses seems to be a permanent feature of today's litigious
society, efforts like those of the Tenth Circuit in Head v. Lithonia will ease
thejudiciary's growing burden regarding the admissibility of expert tes-
timony based on scientific evidence.
L joane Garcia-Colson
